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Abstract. Government of India has initiated the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) or N 1 REGS in 2006 where the basic 
objective is to provide 100 full man-days of employment to each willing rural household. 
The adjoining act (NREG Act of 2005) that guarantees employment of every rural 
household for 100 days has different provisions to incentivize participation of women in the 
programme. The programme indeed has both direct and indirect aspects towards favoring 
the participation of women in order to fulfill a larger objective of women empowerment. 
Thus it becomes imperative to focus on the extent to which the programme is inclusive of 
women. Official data suggest that 47% of all NREGS workers are women. However, in this 
regard, there is substantial variation not only across states but also across different regions 
within a state. The present paper based on a primary survey made in Birbhum district of 
West Bengal, attempts to investigate whether expansion of NREGS has been able to help 
the female job-card holders to get employment through NREGS where we have considered 
ratio of female man days to total man days of a household as the outcome variable. It is 
observed that the heterogeneity in the value of the stated outcome variable is significantly 
caused by nature of works the female job card holders have to carry out under NREGS and 
family parameters faced by them which somehow emanate from socio-cultural factor(s) in 
general and binding in particular. Apart from this, although there is inevitability of the 
influence of total number of NREGS man- days received in the entire reference period by 
the household to which the female member(s) belongs, yet, there seems no one to one 
correspondence between the outcome variable and the same.  
Keywords. National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), Female employment 
generation in NREGS, Nature of works, Family parameters, Type II Tobit model with 
endogenous regressor. 
JEL. C34, C36, D10, J16. 
 
1. Introduction 
he basic objective of National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(NREGS) is to arrange 100 man-days of guaranteed employment for each 
willing rural household. Like traditional public works programmes this also 
offers a unique opportunity for women to earn cash incomes in a context where, 
too often, the ability of women to work outside the home is severely constrained by 
social norms. Actually the NREGS has different progressive provisions to 
incentivize participation of women in the programme. The NREG act had an 
objective to ensure that women have equitable and easy access to work, decent 
working conditions and equal payment of wages to keep gender equity in informal 
sector which certainly is expected to have spillover effects on other sectors. But in 
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a male dominated society, it is sometimes difficult to believe that within a 
household, women’s decision to avail of employment under the NREGS would get 
precedence over the decision of the male members. 
Khera & Nayak (2009) commented that the NREGS is unique in the context of 
two key features. First, the Act prescribes that at least a third of all workers be 
women. Second, since the entitlement to at least 100 days of work is at the 
household level, the allocation of the work is left to the household members 
allowing space for the participation of women. MGNREGA Sameeksha, 
Government of India (2012) views that in addition to the above features, there are 
provisions for facilities such as childcare at the worksites that aim to reduce the 
barriers to women’s participation. Further, several other aspects of the Act in 
principle are indicative of creating an ambience favourable to women, for example, 
the stipulation that the work is within five kilometers of an applicant’s residence. 
Holmes et al. (2011) discusses about the measures incorporated by the operational 
guidelines which are sensitive to gender related issues. The recommendation 
regarding opening bank accounts for wage payments is that the local government 
should consider joint accounts to avoid crediting earnings solely to the male 
member of the household. The operational guidelines also recommend that women 
be given preference on worksites closest to their dwelling. As far as social audit 
forums are concerned, the guideline recommends that it must be conveniently 
scheduled for the workers so that women and marginalized communities can 
participate without constraints.  
During the first eight years since its implementation, administrative data of the 
NREGS suggests that a large number of women have been involved in the scheme. 
Pankaj & Tankha (2009) based on field survey support the view that the NREGS 
has been inclusive and empowering of women. In another survey based study 
(Pankaj & Tankha, 2010), they also examined the empowerment effects of NREGS 
on rural women in Bihar, Jharkhand, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh and argued 
that women workers have gained from the scheme primarily because of the paid 
employment opportunity, and benefits have been realized through income-
consumption effects, intra-household effects and the enhancement of choice and 
capability. Reddy (2013) comments that the introduction of the NREGS, with 
minimum and equal wages for male and female workers, did bring about not only 
an increase in the overall agricultural wages but also reduction in the male-female 
wage differential. 
At the same time, Dreze & Oldiges (2007) and Dutta et al. (2012) find that there 
are large interstate variations in the extent of women’s participation which indicate 
that the NREGS has not been uniformly inclusive of women. It can be reiterated 
that Dutta et al. (2012) also found that although the scheme is reaching the rural 
poor and backward classes and is attracting poor women into the workforce, yet 
there is considerable unmet demand for work on the scheme in all states, and more 
so in the poorest ones, where the scheme is needed most. Liu & Barrett (2013) 
using NSSO data examined differences across men and women along a number of 
aspects; possessing a job card, seeking work under the NREGS and participation 
and rationing rate, defined as the proportion of job seekers who were not allocated 
work. Narayanan & Das (2014) studied the extent to which the scheme is inclusive 
of women, with a particular focus on sub-populations of women such as widows 
and mothers of young children who typically face serious constraints in the context 
of labour market participation. They found that while the scheme has indeed been 
inclusive of women, the substantial variations both across states and the exclusion 
of vulnerable groups of women need attention. In fact provision of child care 
facilities is one of the entitlements provided under the NREG Act to encourage 
women to work. But surveys and anecdotal evidence suggest that this provision is 
not always available (Dasgupta & Sudarshan, 2011).  
According to MGNREGA Sameeksha (2012), in the financial year 2011-12 
female participation in NREGS was 47% on an average at the national level and in 
certain number of states we observe such participation lies below national level. 
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West Bengal is one of the states having lower than average performance, where, 
women participation percentage in the financial year 2011-12 was only 32. Thus 
inter alia it is evident that the objective of inclusiveness of women in NREGS is 
vitiated so far as its uniformity is concerned. 
As a matter of fact, several factors may be active either jointly or single 
handedly across different regions and communities behind generation of female 
employment among rural households through NREGS especially for married 
female members and these are (i) inter-household factor(s) (ii) woman specific 
factor(s) and (iii) intra-household factor(s). Considering all the factors 
simultaneously still no investigation has been done to identify the specific one(s) 
which is (are) much more responsible to influence employment generation among 
rural women (mainly married) through NREGS. Against this backdrop we want to 
investigate the effectiveness of NREGS in the agriculturally backward areas to 
generate female employment in the scheme and to this end, it makes an empirical 
exercise with intent of objectivity. Here we have considered ratio of female man 
days to total man days of a household in an entire reference year as the outcome 
variable. This quasi experiment study is totally based on primary data collected 
from four gram panchayats of two randomly selected blocks of Birbhum district of 
West Bengal considering 2012-13 as the reference period.  
 
2. Sample design and methodology 
In West Bengal, out of 19 districts, we have chosen Birbhum district as sample 
district for our impact evaluation. While the choice of the district was primarily 
driven by pragmatic concerns, yet the selection can be justified on several grounds. 
In 2006, the Ministry of Panchayati Raj named Birbhum as one of the country’s 
250 most backward districts. It is also one of the first phase districts in West 
Bengal as regards implementation of NREGS and it is one of the three most 
backward and vulnerable districts in West Bengal also. The soil type is older 
alluvial in the east and laterite in the west. The district is climatically varied and is 
prone to both drought and flood situation. It is primarily an agricultural district 
with around 75% of the population being dependent on agriculture. 
Birbhum district has 19 blocks out of which we have randomly chosen two 
blocks, Rajnagar and Suri-1. Again from Rajnagar, we have randomly chosen 
Tantipara and Gangmuri-Joypur gram panchayats whereas from Suri-1 we have 
randomly chosen Mallickpur and Nogori gram panchayats. For proper 
effectiveness of study of this public policy we have to consider household as a unit.  
In any impact evaluation study, we have to investigate how have outcomes 
changed with the intervention relative to what would have occurred without 
intervention. But it is difficult to judge the outcome of the same individual with 
and without intervention because people can only be in one circumstance at a time. 
Often treatments that influence outcomes do not just happen naturally; they are 
implemented precisely to influence outcomes. Different public policies 
implemented by the government is an example of it. Sometimes treatments are 
made on the basis of some non-economic factors like political considerations. In 
this situation an investigator cannot randomly assign people or two separate units 
like treatment group and control group. So to do proper impact evaluation; instead 
of ‘control group’ we can consider a ‘comparison group’ and the experiment 
becomes not natural experiment but quasi-experiment. In any quasi-experimental 
study, two sets of households are required. We have a ‘treatment group’, a set of 
households who are affected by policy change and a ‘comparison group’, a set of 
households who are not or partially affected by policy change. Actually finding a 
proper counterfactual to treatment is always a challenge. After eight years of the 
implementation of the scheme as far as the tenure of this study is concerned, it was 
hardly possible to find out non-participant of this scheme at least in our study area 
among the poor households. So participant-non-participant approach will not be 
applicable; instead, two kinds of households are selected in our experiment 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 4(1), A. Kundu, & S. Talukdar, p.107-120. 
110 
110 
according to the number of days they got employment in NREGS in the reference 
period 2012-13.  
Initially from the official website of NREGS we have identified the beneficiary 
households of the sample gram panchayats who got 60 man-days or more through 
NREGS in the entire reference period and the households who received 15 or less 
man-days job in those same sample gram panchayats in the entire reference period. 
All such households were surveyed on the basis of our well designed questionnaire.  
The survey work was done between June and August 2013. So this quasi 
experiment is based on cross-sectional primary data. Different socio-economic 
information was collected from the sample households. The Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs) were also conducted in all the selected villages with the 
village community including workers to substantiate the data collected from the 
individual worker. 
In this impact evaluation, households got more than 60 man-days of work 
through NREGS is considered as ‘treatment group’ and households worked less 
than 15 man-days through NREGS is considered as ‘comparison group’.i 
Total number of sample households is 286, out of which 180 households belong 
to treatment group and 106 households belong to comparison group.  We took 
special care to ensure that the comparison group closely matched the treatment 
group by economic, physical, and social attributes. 
The main objective of ‘impact evaluation’ is to assess whether a scheme or 
intervention has achieved its intended outcomes (here inclusiveness of women or 
simply generation of female employment in NREGS). NREGS is a public policy 
initiated by the Government of India and at present it has almost been implemented 
in all the implementable districts of India but the intensity is different. It may be 
reiterated that we have to investigate whether expansion of NREGS is able to help 
the female job-card holders to get more employment through NREGS or not. As 
discussed above, due to practical constraints, randomized experiment is not 
possible during the time of evaluating the effectiveness of this policy because it is 
difficult to find sufficient number of poor rural households in a locality who still 
did not participate in this scheme. So we have to depend on ‘quasi-experiment’ 
which can be carried out in a realistic setting more often than randomized 
experiment because evaluation of the scheme occurs after important funding have 
been made and researchers cannot randomly assign people to treatment group and 
control group. Participation in NREGS is mainly through self-selection 
mechanism. Hence, we have chosen those households in the ‘treatment group’ 
category who have got larger benefits of NREGS through securing large number of 
man-days of employment in the entire reference period. Alongside, during the time 
of choosing ‘comparison group’ instead of ‘control group’, we carefully have to 
consider those households as sample that not only have comparable socio-
economic background with treatment group but also have participated less or ‘zero’ 
man-days in NREGS in the entire reference period.  
The agro-climatic and farming conditions were almost identical in the sample 
villages, where predominance of mono-cropping was observed. The sample 
villages were not particularly prosperous, and the residents in the survey area had 
limited opportunities for alternative employment in the local private non-farm 
sector and elsewhere. This is substantiated by the following illustrations. 
As regards employment in private nonfarm activities within the sample villages, 
on the basis of Table 1 it is observed that nearly 54% households from treatment 
group are not engaged in the same and another 42% households are engaged for 
less than 40 days in the entire year corresponding to the reference period. Again 
around 54% of the sample households belonging to comparison group do not have 
access to private nonfarm activities and another 46% have less than 40 man-days of 
work in the entire reference period. Moreover in almost all sorts of nonfarm 
engagement, the wage rate per man- day is Rs 100 which is not at par with NREGS 
wage rate. Thus it is imperative that problem of joblessness in our study areas be 
reduced by formulating a comprehensive policy for employment like NREGS.  
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Table 1. Distribution of private nonfarm activities among the sample households in terms of 
man-days 
Number of man-days in private nonfarm activities Treatment group Comparison group 
Nil 97(53.89%) 57(53.77%) 
01-40 75(41.66%) 29(46.23%) 
41-100 08(4.45%) 0 
Total 180(100%) 106(100%) 
Source: Field survey conducted by the researcher 
  
Thus on the basis of Table 1 we can say that in the study area, there are little 
opportunities for alternative supplementary employment beyond agriculture which 
urgently necessitates for a comprehensive public works program. 
The urgency for a comprehensive public works scheme is further accentuated if 
we get an idea regarding employment of female in private nonfarm activities within 
the village. Table 2 shows that nearly 74% households from treatment group had 
reported that their female members were not engaged in any kind of private 
nonfarm activities and nearly 24% households have females who are engaged for 
less than 40 days in the entire year corresponding to the reference period. Again 
around 73% of the sample households belonging to comparison group possess 
female members who do not have access to private nonfarm activities and another 
18% have less than 40 man-days of work throughout the year. Only 2% of the 
sample households belonging to treatment group and 9% of the sample households 
belonging to comparison group managed to get moderate man-days of employment 
and that is mainly as domestic worker in the locality or near-by locality. We have 
already mentioned that our study area is not economically solvent. Hence 
possibility of employment generation among female as domestic worker is also 
very restricted. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of private nonfarm activities among the female members of 
households in terms of man-days 
Number of female man-days in private 
nonfarm activities 
Treatment group(no. 
and % of HHs) 
Comparison group(no. 
and % of HHs) 
Nil 133(73.89%) 77(72.64%) 
01-40 43(23.89%) 19(17.93%) 
51 and above 4(2.22%) 10(9.43%) 
Total 180(100%) 106(100%) 
Source: Field survey conducted by the researcher 
 
A significant characteristic of the region we studied is that there is almost no 
incidence of distress migration. More than 90% households within the treatment 
group do not migrate in the lean period and above 95% households belonging to 
comparison group are non migrants. Although the reason behind non migration is 
not explicitly cited by the sample households, yet we apprehend that for these 
people, the cost of migration might be very high 
 
Table 3. Incidence of daily distress migration among sample households 
Number of days of daily distress migration Treatment group Comparison group 
Nil 163(90.56%) 101(95.28%) 
01-50 09(5%) 04(3.77%) 
Above 50 08(4.44%) 01(0.9%) 
Total 180(100%) 106(100%) 
Source: Field survey conducted by the researcher 
 
Table 3 depicts the incidence of migration outside the village among the sample 
households. Besides the fact that a large section within the treatment and 
comparison group do not migrate, we also observe that 5% households from the 
treatment group and a little over 3% households from the comparison group 
migrate for less than 50 days throughout the whole year. Thus, with immediate 
effect we can anticipate as a corollary that there is no question of female migration 
outside the village and that is by our observation in the study area. As a 
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consequence, the possibility of generation of female employment on that front 
undoubtedly gets negated. 
As mentioned earlier that the chosen study area in Birbhum district is 
predominantly mono-cropping in nature. Further, the sample farming households 
both in the treatment group and comparison group are mostly marginal farming 
households. Apart from this, a gigantic portion of the sample households within 
both groups belongs to agricultural labour class. Moreover, illustration of Table 1, 
Table 2 and Table 3 brings out that a remarkable size of sample households have 
little or no access to either private nonfarm activities within the village or migrated 
job available outside their villages, implying very meager sources of alternative 
employment opportunities not to mention about the female community. Thus the 
sample households in the study area are not only poor; their poverty is also 
accompanied by limited or no employment opportunities in the agriculturally lean 
period, making them absolutely vulnerable. Moreover, it is not difficult to 
introspect that the female members of these households need emphasized priority 
so far as their employability is concerned. It is here where expansive and 
inclusiveness character of NREGS pertaining to women becomes imperative. 
 As already mentioned, total number of sample households is 286, out of which 
180 households got 60 man-days or more through NREGS in the entire reference 
period and 106 households received 15 or less man-days job in the same reference 
period2. The first set of households is referred to as the treatment group and the 
second set of households is called the comparison group in the entire future 
analysis. The underlying empirical exercise is in its essence an impact evaluation 
study, where, we try to understand whether NREGS becomes efficient to generate 
rural public non-farm employment to female members and to identify the ex-
factor(s) (if any) which can influence women’s participation in NREGS. In other 
words, the observations are truncated for impact evaluation intending to evaluate 
whether more number of NREGS man-days received by the household implies 
proportionately more participation of female in the same or it is further 
substantiated by other factors.  
 
3. The Model and its Results 
We have already mentioned that, the outcome variable is the ratio of female 
man days to total man days received by the sample household through NREGS in 
the entire reference period (rofnregs) and ]1,0[rofnregs . Intuitively it may be 
assumed plausible that a female member of a household can seek proportionately 
more man-days of employment through NREGS if the household she belongs to 
can manage more man-days of employment resulting in the increase in the value of 
outcome variable. But, it is observed from our field investigation that seeking more 
man-days of employment through NREGS from the point of view of a household 
does not in all cases indicate that female members of those households will 
participate intensively in this public employment scheme. It came out from our 
field investigation that there exist considerable number of sample households who 
managed more than 60 man-days of employment through NREGS, but the 
participation of the female members of those households in NREGS is very poor 
and in some situations it was zero. Besides that there are a few sample households 
who could not manage high man-days of employment through NREGS in the entire 
reference period but the proportionate participation of the female job-card holders 
of those households is considerably high.  
Out of our 286 sample households, there are 118 households (both belonging to 
treatment and comparison group) where the female members of the sample 
households did not do any work in man-day through NREGS in the entire reference 
period and the outcome variable in terms of positive integer is available in the 
remaining 168 sample households but the value of it is in any case not more than 
13. Actually only among two households, its female members have participated 
maximum 80 man-days of employment and the value of the outcome variable is 
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0.8. So it is clear that female employment in man-days through NREGS takes not 
only strictly positive values but it also takes on zero4 with positive probability. So 
we can take the help of Type-II Tobit model in this impact evaluation.5   
Here truncation in the sample is observed in our investigation and it is due to 
incidental truncation6 as well as truncation due to survey design. So the taken 
sample is non-random in nature.  
On the basis of our observations from the field survey, it is hypothesized that 
participation of female in NREGS depends on several factors: (i) inter household 
factor(s), (ii) women specific factor(s) and (iii) intra-household factor(s). All those 
three types of factors are considered simultaneously in the ‘Generalized Tobit’ 
regression equation7 for impact evaluation.   
As a matter of fact, to judge the effectiveness of NREGS to generate 
employment among female job-card holders one has to depend on impact 
evaluation technique. Besides that, here both intra as well as inter household 
factors are considered simultaneously to investigate the relative strength of the 
factors responsible to influence employment generation among female job-card 
holders through NREGS. This study will help us to derive few policy implications 
related to this factor which will be narrated in the last part of this paper.    
 
3.1. Possible factors which may influence female employment generation 
in NREGS 
treatdummyi → The variable takes the value 1 if the ith household as a unit got 
60 or more man-days of NREGS work in the entire reference period (i.e. if the 
sample households belong to treatment group) and it is 0 if the ith household 
receives 15 or less number of man days of work under NREGS (i.e. if the sample 
households belong to comparison group)8. This variable here represents the inter-
household factor which will influence ‘rofnregs’. Intuitively we can say that a 
female job card holder will get increasingly more man-days of employment if and 
only if the household she belongs to, can manage good number of man-days of 
employment in the entire reference period. But in actual practice for a considerable 
number of sample households belonging to ‘treatment group’ female members did 
‘0’ man- days of employment or very few man-days of employment in the entire 
reference period. Hence, ‘treatdummy’ although may influence ‘rofnregs’, yet the 
relationship may neither be monotonic nor be having one to one correspondence.  
We know that NREGS is operated through self-selection mechanism. Besides 
that, this policy is implemented through local panchayat. So following Kundu 
(2015), this variable can be endogenous in nature which may generate sample 
selectivity problem.     
tfmemberi → Total number of female members in the ith household. This 
variable may have a bearing on the total number of days of NREGS work obtained 
by female members in the household. Actually in our survey area all the adult 
female members of the sample households are job-card holders. So it is expected 
that more employment through NREGS among the adult female members can be 
managed if the household has more female job-card holders.  
natureowrki → It is considered as a female specific factor and here expressed in 
dummy. In our study area, the main task done under NREGS was digging of soil 
and that is 60 cubic feet to complete one man-day work. It came out from our field 
investigation that such type of work is considered physically constraining for 
female job card holders both of treatment as well as comparison group. During the 
time of field survey, the respondent of each sample household was asked: ‚do they 
consider the nature of work assigned to them under the program physically 
challenging for women?‛ We asked them to answer in affirmative or negative (i.e, 
yes or no). Thus, in the cases, where the answer is affirmative we took 1 and 
otherwise 09. Interestingly women are not excluded from job-card holding, but the 
nature of job are sometimes possibly active against women of some sample 
households for working under NREGS10.  
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familyprmtri → This is an intra-household factor and is narrated as a ‘dummy’ 
regressor. An important factor which can influence participation of female 
members in NREGS is whether there are facilities in the workplace pertaining to 
women like child care facilities and/or availability of work not far from home. In 
our study area, the first kind of facility was not at all observed and this feature is 
rampant across the country as mentioned earlier (Dasgupta & Sudarshan, 2011). So 
we interrogated about the second facility which is sometimes highly related with 
the first one. Actually due-to lack of availability of child care facilities, most 
women who have children mainly below 6 years cannot bring them to the worksite 
as it is not considered as safe place for them. They are also restricted by the other 
members of their households to participate in NREGS. Besides that among a 
considerable number of sample households, it is observed that the women married 
members have to look after the elder members of the household. So if they are not 
offered job nearer to their native village, they cannot participate in NREGS in spite 
of their willingness mainly due to their household work pressure reflecting family 
parameters. It came out from our field investigation that 27 sample households 
belonging to treatment group and 37 sample households belonging to comparison 
group reported that the female members cannot participate in NREGS work 
because to do that they had to travel far distance from their native village which is 
not possible for them due to family parameters. Here the variable as we have 
already mentioned previously is dummy in nature taking value 1 for ‘yes’ and ‘0’ 
for ‘no’ to the following question; ‚do you find it difficult for the female member 
to go and work under NREGS after sustaining the household work pressure‛? Thus 
out and out family parameter plays a vital role in determining the participation of 
women itself in the scheme and if yes, the intensity of it. The underlying factor 
functioning implicitly with the prevailing one is the socio-cultural norm. A very 
notable feature observed in the study area was that the female participation in the 
program is guided by socio-cultural factors nourished either consciously or 
subconsciously by the male members of the household. So this variable stands for 
the socio cultural norms in general and bindings in particular attached with the ith 
household. So if the work is not available closer to a household’s dwelling, 
generation of female employment is constrained either due to pragmatic reason like 
household work pressure or exclusively due to socio-cultural binding on married 
women members or both. The variable ‘familyprmtr’ captures the whole flavor 
here. 
Only 12 sample households belonging to treatment group and 15 sample 
households belonging to comparison group replied during the time of field 
investigation that they would not send the female members of their households in 
NREGS work due to ‘natureowrk’ and ‘familyprmtr’ both. It is tested that no 
correlation exists between, ‘natureowrk’ and ‘familyprmtr’. Hence we can rule out 
the possibility of multi-co linearity during the time of estimating Eq.(1).    
bpli → this variable symbolizes whether ith household belongs to BPL or APL 
category. It is 1 for BPL and 0 for APL. The intention is to investigate whether 
BPL category households are more prone to send their female members in NREGS 
job market or not.  
So the original equation we need to estimate is: 
 
𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑠𝑖 =∝0+∝1 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 +∝2 𝑡𝑓𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖 +∝3 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑤𝑟𝑘𝑖 +
∝4 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑚𝑡𝑟𝑖 +∝5 𝑏𝑝𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖         (1) 
 
Here i  is assumed to be normally distributed. We know that NREGS is mainly 
demand driven. Still the intensity of participation among the households in this 
public works scheme is likely to be based on unobserved factors which are 
accommodated in i  in Equation (1) which means selection is likely to be 
correlated with i  (Kundu, 2015). So here ‘treatdummy’ is initially considered as 
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‘endogenous variable in nature in Eq.(1). So during impact evaluation, to tackle the 
possible problem of selectivity bias we have to depend on Two Steps Treatment 
effect model developed by Heckman because here the value of the explained 
variable is observed both for the treatment group and also for the comparison 
group. In the following selection equation, we will consider two factors i.e. 
‘psdummy’ and ‘tearningsland’ which can influence ‘treatdummy’ of Eq. (1) but 
those two variables do not appear as explanatory variables in Eq.(1). (Kundu & 
Talukdar, 2015) 
Number of days that the ith household got employment in different kinds of jobs 
i.e. in private non-farm sector in the locality or outside the locality excluding 
NREGS in the entire reference period may likely to have an influence on the 
number of man days of the NREGS work participated by the household. But in our 
observation it is tested that those days have no influence on participation through 
NREGS because of very low presence of private non-farm employment 
opportunity in the study area. So this factor is ignored in Eq.(2) below11.    
 
3.2. Possible factor(s) which may influence the intensity of participation 
in NREGS i.e. ‘treatdummy’ of Eq(1)   
psdummyi → psdummy indicates ‘Panchayat specific’ dummy. Field survey has 
shown that getting jobs (and even number of man days of jobs) under NREGS 
depends to a large extent on the efficacy of the local panchayat. Along with this, 
political clientalism and affiliation to the household by the ruling party play a vital 
role as well. As most of the households are not explicit about their political stand, 
here we took the ‘psdummy’ indicating whether they are satisfied with the overall 
work of the panchayat or not (1 if yes, 0 if no) to capture the flavor of all the above 
facts. Here, it must be mentioned that we observed heterogeneity as well as mixed 
response in this regard, implying no one to one correspondence between like values 
of treatdummy and psdummy. Hence there is no reason to believe that the 
households belonging to treatment group are assigned value 1 in respect of 
psdummy and vice versa. In our field investigation 46 out of 180 sample 
households of ‘treatment group’ and 73 out of 106 sample households belonging to 
comparison group reported that they were not satisfied with the work of the local 
panchayat.   
tearningslandi → Net farm income from owned land of the ith sample household 
in the entire reference year.  In our investigation 65 out of 180 sample households 
belonging to ‘treatment group’ and 39 out of 106 sample households belonging to 
‘comparison group’ were land owners though all of them are marginal farmers. It 
has already been mentioned that the survey area is mainly mono-cropping area. But 
sometimes they cultivate different horticultural product during post rainy season 
from which their net-farm income enhances. So, there is a possibility that members 
of these landholding farm households will seek less employment through NREGS 
for these farm activities because the farm income is a source of income of the 
landowners. This variable in accommodated in Eq.(2). We have calculated net total 
farm income of the marginal farmer households by first computing their value of 
total output sold (total output sold x market price). Then we add total value of 
output kept for self consumption (amount x market price) and thus get the value of 
total output produced (Total Revenue). After that we calculate the total cost of 
cultivation under different heads (Total Cost).12 Finally after subtracting total cost 
from total revenue, we can get net total farm income in monetary terms. 
Thus we discover that, although NREGS is operating under self-selection 
mechanism, there may be some factor(s) due to which a household demands job 
but cannot always get that when demanded. This factor is tested through 
‘psdummy’. Besides that there may be another factor due to which the household 
itself is not willing to secure more man-days of employment through NREGS. So 
through ‘selection equation’ we want to identify the factors due to which we 
observe heterogeneity among the households during the time of getting jobs 
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through NREGS in terms of total man days in the entire reference period in our 
survey region. The selection equation is expressed as: 
 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑠𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖    (2) 
 
We have already mentioned that to do the impact evaluation, we have to depend 
on Treatment effect model developed by Heckman (because the value of ‘rofnregs’ 
is observed both for the treatment group and for the comparison group). It can also 
be here called Type-II Tobit model or generalized Tobit model and this is identical 
to the Heckman model. The difference between the Heckman type model and 
Tobit-II type model is that in Heckman type model we have to perform Two step 
estimation but Tobit-II type model prefers maximum likelihood estimation. Here 
this method is applied after considering possible existence of sample selection bias. 
If it exists, then to get consistent estimate of the Type II Tobit model we have to 
consider another explanatory variable ‘ iˆ ’ (Inverse Mill’s ratio, which we can get 
through applying Probit model in selection equation apart) with the already 
mentioned explanatory variables mentioned in Eq.(1) . Let us first cite the result of 
the selection equation in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Probit model narrated through Eq.(2)  Dependent variable: ‘treatdummy’ 
Name of the variable Co-efficient Standard Error 
tearningsland -0.0000751** 0.0000395 
psdummy 3.4612* 0.386 
constant -.7969* .154 
Notes: * significant at 1% level    and ** significant at 5% level 
 
In the Type-II Tobit model, we can have the Inverse Mill’s ratio iˆ   for each ‘i’ 
and then we have to apply simple Tobit model to estimate iˆ considering iˆ  as 
additional variable. The result is shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Two step Treatment Effect Estimation in Tobit-II model:Dependent variable:  
‘rofnregs’ 
Name of the variable Value of the Marginal co-efficient Standard error 
treatdummy 0.17894* 0.0301 
tfmember -0.18102 0.31 
natureowrk -0.3549* 0.0297 
familyprmtr -0.1215* .0272 
bpl 0.0311 0.0287 
constant 0.3151* .04785 
iˆ  
-0.262* 0.0291 
Notes: Wald  )5(2 = 340.63*; * significant at 1% level 
 
As the value of the coefficient of iˆ  is statistically significant we can reject the 
null hypothesis and say that two step treatment effect model in this Type-II Tobit 
model is appropriate.  
Total number of observations is 286, and out of 286 observations, 110 are left 
censored at 0rofnregs  and remaining 176 are uncensored observations13. The 
value of Wald )5(2 =1039.48 and is significant at 1% level which establishes 
goodness of fit of the above model and can conclude that the covariates used in the 
regression model are appropriate. The parameter estimate of ˆ  is -0.262 and it is 
statistically significant. So sample selection bias problem is corrected after 
considering iˆ  as another explanatory variable in Eq.(1). To justify this statement 
the result of our Probit regression mentioned in Eq.(2) is given in Table-4 which 
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shows big influence of ‘clientalism’ 14  during the time of seeking employment 
through NREGS. It is also observed that if total earnings from land increases then 
the household will seek less man days of employment through NREGS. 
 
4. Discussion of the Results mentioned in Table 5 based on 
Eq.(1) 
The results of the Two-step Tobit equation mentioned in Table-5 show that the 
value of the marginal coefficient is positive for the ‘treatdummy’. This implies that 
the ratio of man-days the female-member of the household has worked through 
NREGS and total man-days the household secured job through NREGS may 
increase if the household as a whole can secure more man-days of employment 
through this public employment generation scheme and the possibility of it will be 
much higher if the household is landless and can manage good favor from local 
panchayat. But the value of the parameter estimate is 0.17 which establishes total 
absence of one to one relation between the two variables i.e. the female job card 
holder may not always manage to secure more man-days of employment through 
NREGS even if the male members can manage that. Thus, this variable does not 
suffice to explain the heterogeneity in the value of the ‘rofnregs’ among the sample 
households.  
The absolute value of the marginal coefficient explained in Table 5 is highest 
for ‘natureowrk’. The negative significant value of its coefficient establishes the 
fact that lack of suitable type of work opportunity among the female job card 
holders from their physical capability standpoint is the main reason behind poor 
employment generation among female members in our study area through NREGS.  
It is also observed that due to family parameters explicitly expressed through 
household work pressure and/or implicitly reflecting the socio cultural binding, a 
sizable number of female job card holders failed to participate in NREGS. Here it 
has to be remembered that this variable accommodates the household duty of the 
female job card holder or an implicit fact of social binding on the female members 
of a household or both. If the sample household has aged as well as child members, 
then female member has to look after them, and it becomes difficult for those 
female members to work in NREGS if it is offered to her at a distant place. So we 
can say that due to family obligation and absence of empowerment (intra-
household decision making power) among themselves the female job card holders 
are prevented to participate in this employment generation scheme even if they are 
offered job in a slightly distant place from their native village. 
 Total number of female job card holder and BPL Category of the sample 
household have no significant effect to influence employment generation among 
female members of the household through NREGS.       
 
5. Observations 
The present research work aimed to investigate the effectiveness of NREGS to 
generate employment among women. In this micro-level quasi-experimental study 
it is initially noticed that ‘clientalism’ is very much prominent for a sample 
household during the time of securing employment through NREGS in our study 
area. It is proved through selection equation that without loyalty to the political 
party whose members occupy the prime posts of panchayat, it becomes difficult for 
the poor rural households to secure more man-days of employment through 
NREGS. So the female job card holders are also deprived to secure more man-days 
of employment through this scheme. But that is not the only cause due to which we 
can say that there is heterogeneity in the employment generation among the women 
through NREGS in our study area. A large number of female job card holders 
cannot participate in this scheme due to lack of suitable type of work. Due to lack 
of physical capacity, a large number of female members do not prefer to work like 
‘digging of soil’. Sometimes they are prevented by the male members of their 
households to do this type of work. Besides that local panchayat sometimes have to 
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arrange job in a distant village which may be more than five kilometers from the 
native village of the job card holders without arranging for any child care facility in 
those areas. The female job card holders due to different types of family 
obligations like looking after their children and elderly persons and lack of 
empowerment cannot participate in this employment generation scheme. They have 
to abide by the decision of the elders and mainly their husbands.  
 
6. Policy Implications 
We can thus suggest some policy implications which may generate more 
employment among the female job card holders through NREGS and these are as 
follows: 
a. Problem of ‘clientalism’ during the time of arranging employment among 
the village job seekers through NREGS should be minimized. A proper 
sensitization of the local administration in this regard is mandatory. 
b. Women can as much as possible be allotted works such as plantation and 
the likes which are not heavily manual like digging of soil etc. This will to a large 
extent mitigate the reluctance and reservations of the concerned male members of 
the households to send their female counterparts to the work. 
c. It must be strictly followed that the works be arranged for women near to 
their dwelling so that they can avail of the NREGS projects without being anxious 
about their children and elders in their home. Besides that, the local panchayat 
must make provisions for child care facilities at the worksites as enshrined in the 
NREG act. Either or both these measures are expected to mobilize the women to 
participate more intensively in this employment generation scheme. 
Results have shown that enhancement in the earnings from land will reduce the 
demand for NREGS works. As NREGS is an ongoing scheme, it must be optimally 
used for creation of proper ambience for turning the mono-cropping areas into bi-
cropping and so on. This to large extent may reduce the pressure from demand side 
for the NREGS jobs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 4(1), A. Kundu, & S. Talukdar, p.107-120. 
119 
119 
Notes 
 
1 These thresholds are chosen bearing a compatibility with the overall trend of the study area. 
2 Minimum number of man-days as a whole a sample household belonging to comparison group had 
worked through NREGS was 12. 
3 Maximum man-days female members get the work must not be more than the household as a unit 
can seek in a particular accounting year. 
4 It is the situation of corner solution. 
5 Type II Tobit model is applied in the presence of missing data problem-i.e. when we truly have 
sample selection issue. Since we have a sample in which information on the regressand is available 
only for some observations, therefore it is called a censored sample. 
6 It is the decision of a household whether to participate in NREGS or not. In our sample all the 
households have participated in NREGS in the entire reference period but we observe huge 
heterogeneity during the time of securing employment through this public works scheme in the 
entire reference period. So for impact evaluation sample is designed by the surveyor. 
7 It is a censored regression model as well as a truncated regression model where the sample is non-
random and we do not observe any information about certain segment of the population i.e. the rural 
households in our survey region who worked more than 15 but less than 60 man-days in NREGS in 
the entire reference period. Actually in our investigation we have targeted a particular subset of 
population, entirely ignoring the other segment of population. 
8 The variable is considered here as latent variable because to get consistent estimator in our Type-II 
Tobit model, initially we have to take the Probit estimation which can be done through Eq.(2) 
narrated later. 
9 Out of 180 sample households belonging to ‘treatment group’ the answer was affirmative among 59 
sample households i.e. the female members of those households in spite of being job card holders 
cannot participate in NREGS or can  participate very few man-days exclusively because of the 
nature of work assigned to them which they are physically incapable of. In case of ‘comparison 
group’ households, the number was 46 out of 106. This information indicates that a household as a 
whole can manage good man-days of employment through NREGS in an entire reference year but 
that does not mean that female members of those households can seek proportionately more man-
days of employment. Actually in some cases there may be barriers from their own home and also 
from the local NREGS officials citing the reason that women are mostly incapable of doing such 
heavy manual work. In such cases, in spite of their willingness they cannot participate in NREGS 
more intensively. 
10 Interestingly among the female-headed households, the female members worked through NREGS. 
So in those households the value of ‘natureowrk’ is 0. 
11 It is used to address the issues of self-selection and the estimation of treatment effect model when 
there is non-random allocation of subjects to treatment and comparison group as is generally the 
case with observational data. 
12 Here total cost includes cost of seeds, hand tractors/bullocks, different fertilizers at purchase price, 
pesticides at purchase price, water, hired labour in terms of total wage bill and other costs if any. 
13 This is because no female member of our sample household has got 100 man-days of employment 
in the entire reference period. Maximum number of man-days the female member of a sample 
household got job through NREGS is 80 and minimum is 0. So the value of ‘rofnregs’ never 
exceeds 1 and always took value in the closed interval between ‘0’ and 1 
14  ‘Clientalism’ is the favour a household can manage from local administration of receiving 
government services due to its loyalty for the political party whose members dominate in the local 
administration. 
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